Abstract-Unknown protocol inference are useful for many security application, including intrusion detection which al ways depends on deep packet inspection. However, mining distinguishers with unknown protocol format generally turns to protocol reverse engineering. In this paper, we propose a novel method for automatically abstracting protocol distinguishers 1 based on statistic and our method is proved to be a good tool in finding protocol specifications. To implement and validate our method, we deign a serial of experiments. Then, applied to analyze of the indicators -recall is 99% while precise equals 99.9%, the method was proved highly efficient in the real-world environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Internet protocol identification, traditional methods are mainly based on well-known (TCP or UDP) port numbers or deep packet inspection (DPI). However, quite a few applications utilize well-know port numbers as their default application ports. Consequently, the way of trace recognition using port numbers seems unreliable and inaccurate nowa days. As an alternative mechanism, deep packet inspection is better than other methods for Internet protocol identification, and it is wildly used in data streaming identification.
Using deep packet inspection method for protocol identi fication, protocol distinguishers should be given as a prior. However, for completely new protocols, we know little information about them. Current practices in finding pro tocol specifications are mainly dependent on manual, such as reverse engineering which is very time-consuming and laborious. To find a better method in searching protocol distinguishers is an open topic.
In this paper, We propose a novel method which is in common use in inferring the protocol distinguishers of most unknown protocol. We tackle the problem of mining distinguishers with unknown protocol format automatically based on a statistic method. We do this work merely relying on the flow content without considering other factors. In this paper, We recommend a general mode for discerning the 1 Protocol Distinguishers(PD) are specific strings that distinguish the very protocol from the others.
978-1-4244-6837-9/10/$26.00 ©2010 IEEE 67 protocol distinguishers at the same time. In order to explain the method we suggest in this paper, we take Xunlei 2, which is a popular P2P application in China, as an example. We have evaluated our suggested method with Xunlei protocol. With the protocol we test in the experiment, the accuracy rate achieves to 99.9%, and recall is about 99%. Our method is proved to be a good tool in finding protocol specifications, and also engineers can use this method in protocol reverse engineering.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first review the related work in Section II. Section III describes our method and architecture for automatic mining of distinguishers with unknown protocol format. We give a concrete example in Section IV and show the performance of our method. Finally, we conclude our work with future work research direction in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
Sen et al. [I] carry out their P2P accurate identification by looking for application-specific data within the TCP or UDP payloads. Haffner et al. [2] explore automatically extracting application signatures from IP traffic payload content, and they apply three statistical machine learning algorithms to automatically identify signatures for a range of applications. Justin Ma et al. [3] proposed a method of unexpected means of protocol inference, which can classify the network data belonging to the same protocol automatically. Discoverer [4] and Polyglot [5] pilot the initial explorations of automatic extraction of protocol message format in this research direc tion.
III. METHOD AND ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we will first introduce the process of data collection, and the method of capturing the experiment data. Then in subsection Mining Method, we will introduce our method of automatic mining of distinguishers with unknown protocol format.
A. Data Set Collection
In order to mine protocol distinguishers, we should get learning samples from a given set which is considered as ground truth. There are many ways to get the ground truth of a protocol such as GT [6] , packets under specific port number and the result of reverse engineering etc .. In this paper, we get learning samples by means of inspecting on the port of 15000 in the UDP layer. In this paper, we merely handle packets with a packet size greater than 64 bytes, then we capture about 400,000 flows of Xunlei protocol from backbone routers. We keep the first 16 bytes of each flow in an off-line file, which we do the mining progress from.
Algorithm lOn-line Data Set Collection Method. payload +--New Packet.payload 3: if Sizeof(payload) < 64 then hashindex +--hash(source,sport,dest,dport)
timestamp +--New Packet.timestamp First of all, we introduce our method of data set collection for mining distinguishers. As it is showed in Algorithm 1, we only deal with packets with a payload no less than 64 bytes. That is because Haffner et al. [2] suggest in his paper for the applications considered there is enough information in the first 64 Bytes of each flow to identify the application. Therefore it is proper to focus our concentration on the packets with a payload larger than 64 bytes. In the process of data set collection, we keep a hash table of flows, and we give a hash index to each flow. Each time if hash index is found in hash table, we will not process the packet for the reason that we regard the streaming with an equivalent hash index transfer the same file content in a short time interval. By contrast, if the hash index can not be found in hash table, we will keep the first 16 bytes of the payload of the packet in an off-line file, and add the new hash index in the hash hash table size will grow bigger and we need to update the hash table every a fixed time period, which means we have to delete some items which may not be used in the very near future. The strategy is illustrated in Algorithm 2. We traversal the whole hash table from head to tail and delete the items whose time-stamp plus 64 seconds less than the current time-stamp. Consequently, the hash table will be refreshed once in a while and would not take too much memory space.
B. Mining Method
There are two phases in our method of finding protocol specifications. One is called Learning Phase, and the other is regarded as Labeling Phase.
1) Learning Phase: In Learning Phase, First of all, we count the frequency of each bytes in the off-line files, we only record the bytes whose frequencies exceed the threshold value we set before the experiment. The threshold value, we propose in this paper, is (J which is derived from that we assume that high frequent bytes should appear at least one time every two 16 bytes. In the progress of our method, the threshold value is validity because we iterate to discover protocol distinguishers, which make the threshold value is necessary but not crucial. Then as it is shown in Figure 1 , We merely expand units with a high frequency each time, and the size of units (number of bytes) in our method increase with the procedure of extension in Learning Phase. We cease a learning process when we can not extend the units anymore, and we turn to Labeling Phase.
2) Labeling Phase: In Labeling Phase, we label the off-line file samples with protocol pattern strings, which we obtain in Learning Phase. There is a key problem that when we stop the procedure of labeling. To settle this problem, we define an objective function in Formula 2, and x is a proper position where we have to stop labeling. In the objective function, our goal is to maximize g( x). In Formula 2, f (x) represents coverage rate which means the proportion of labeled samples in the labeling process, and h(x) is normalized P(x) which denotes the probability of appearance of protocol distinguisher in disorderly text with a fixed file size,
where x means the length of protocol distinguisher. In the formula, n stands for the size of a single off-line file, and in this paper n is 16. In this paper, we regard the weight of the component (f (x) and h l x ) ) are equal, so we set the parameters (k1 and k2) to 0.5.
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After labeled all the data with the Protocol Distinguishers, training data set had been divided in two parts, one is labeled data, and the other is unlabeled data. The unlabeled data is used to iterate to mine other Protocol Distinguishers as in Learning Phase. In our method, we stop the whole process when we get a coverage rate beyond 99%.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION METHOD
In this paper, we take Xunlei (which is one of the most widely used P2P application in China) as an example to implementation and assess the method. Experiments are designed as follows:
To implementation the method, two sets of flow data are necessary:
• Training Set: The set is consisted of the special flow data (flow data of Xunlei was used in this paper). This data set is used to search the Protocol Distinguishers of Xunlei.
• Testing Set: The set including the special packet data (packet data of Xunlei) and packet data unrelated to Xunlei protocol is devoted to validate the Protocol Distinguishers which are archived from the training set.
In the experiment, all the data (about 400,000 Xunlei flows in Training Set, Testing Set with 1,000,000 Xunlei packets and 1,000,000 packets unrelated to Xunlei) were obtained from the backbone routers.
B. Assessment Indicator
we make use of recall and precision as assessment indi cators. Recall and precision are common indicators of the effectiveness in a statistical classification task. Recall is a valid measure of completeness, and precision can be seen as a well-grounded measure of exactness or fidelity. Moreover, In this paper, we denote true-positive percentage by TP, true-negative percentage by TN, false-positive percentage by F P, and false-negative by F N. To explain meanings of those symbols, Table I was used.
Assuming A is set of the target f1ow(as Xunlei flows data mentioned in this paper) while A is the test flow data(f1ow data unrelated to Xunlei). 
We carry out our experiment with the method introduced above. According to the Figure 2 we may see in a clear way that g(x) eventually hits a maximum when pattern length equals 5. Based on the results of those experiments, the length of Xunlei protocol distinguishers is set as 5 in our subsequent processes.
The whole process was completed after two iterations which were introduced in the method. Then we examine the result of our experiment, which is shown in Table II. All the protocol distinguishers of our experimental result showed in Table II are extremely the feature of Xunlei protocol, which we get from a consequence of reverse engineering.
At last we computed the indicators to validate the method. The indicators, recall is 99% while precision equals 99.9%, 70 which fully vindicate our method. Furthermore, all the experimental data in this paper was obtained from typical real-world environment, which ensures that our method is fit for practical applications.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel method for resolving a problem of miming distinguishers with unknown protocol format based on a statistic method automatically. From our analysis, our approach is efficacious with a high recall of 99%, and at the same times it is precise with an high accuracy rate of 99.9%. In the future work, we will focus our attention on the work of restoring the format of un known protocol as a substitution or an assistance of reverse engineering.
